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Pros
 Viewing refugees as a public good provides a basis 
for cooperation among countries.
 International cooperation can enable better 
outcomes for refugees and for host country 
populations if the policies are appropriate.
 Large strides have been made in developing the EU’s 
Common European Asylum System.
 Some foundations have been laid for the 
development of a truly EU-wide policy that focuses 
on the distribution of refugees.
 Public opinion is more supportive of supra-national 
policies than is often believed.
ELEVaToR PiTCH
Policy toward asylum-seekers has been controversial. Since 
the late 1990s, the EU has been developing a Common 
European Asylum System, but without clearly identifying 
the basis for cooperation. Providing a safe haven for 
refugees can be seen as a public good and this provides the 
rationale for policy coordination between governments. 
But where the volume of applications differs widely across 
countries, policy harmonization is not sufficient. Burden-
sharing measures are needed as well, in order to achieve 
an optimal distribution of refugees across member states. 
Such policies are economically desirable and are more 
politically feasible than is sometimes believed.
aUTHoR’S main mESSaGE
Offering a safe haven for refugees can be viewed as a public good, and this provides a basis for cooperation on asylum 
policies across EU countries. The Common European Asylum System has harmonized policies, but harmonization has not 
improved the severe imbalance in the distribution of asylum applications across countries. The most realistic option would 
be to first set the central policy to obtain the optimal number for all the countries together and then to reallocate asylum-
seekers to obtain the “right” number for each country. The deeper policy integration that this would require is more feasible 
than is sometimes believed.
Cons
 Policy harmonization between EU countries is not 
sufficient to gain the full benefits of cooperation on 
asylum policies.
 Deeper integration of policies would be required to 
ensure an appropriate distribution of refugees.
 Loss of national control of asylum policy may 
present political challenges for member states.
 Closer cooperation between developed countries is 
only really possible within the framework of the EU.
 Deeper policy integration, while helpful, would have 
only a small impact on the world refugee problem.
Setting policy on asylum: Has the EU got it right?
Harmonizing asylum policies, a noble goal, does not produce the best 
outcomes for refugees or host country populations
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moTiVaTion
Since 1989, more than 12 million applicants for asylum have arrived in developed countries, an 
average of nearly half a million a year (Figure 1). The number has ebbed and flowed in response 
to periodic surges in civil war and human rights abuses in low- and middle-income countries. 
Flows peaked in the early 1990s, largely as a result of the turmoil in eastern and central Europe 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and again in the 
early 2000s, following the breakup of Yugoslavia. The Arab Spring of 2011 launched a third 
wave, shifting the locus of origin and transit countries.
The 25-year surge in asylum applications has provoked widespread controversy, and national 
governments have responded with ever tighter restrictions in what some have seen as a 
policy backlash. The EU has become an increasingly important player as it has developed the 
Common European Asylum System. This paper outlines a framework in which to evaluate 
those policies. It focuses on the deterrent effects of tougher asylum policies and on the rationale 
for cooperation between European host countries. Drawing on existing studies, it argues that 
policy harmonization is not sufficient and that some form of burden-sharing is needed as well.
Figure 1. Total asylum applications by region of asylum, 1989–2013
Source: Author’s analysis based on data from the UN Refugee Agency, Statistical Yearbook 2001: Refugees,
Asylum-seekers and Other Persons of Concern—Trends in Displacement, Protection, and Solutions. Geneva:
UNHCR, 2002; Table C1; and UN Refugee Agency, Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 2005,
2009, 2013. Geneva: UNHCR, 2006, 2010, 2014; Table 1.
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DiSCUSSion oF PRoS anD ConS
Since 1989, the overwhelming majority of asylum-seekers to the developed world have claimed 
asylum in Europe (77%), mostly in the pre-2004 member states of the EU (71%). More than 
half of applications in Europe were received by three countries: Germany (28%), the UK (12%), 
and France (11%). But the distribution of asylum claims per capita of the resident population 
looks very different. The distribution has been very uneven in recent years, with particularly 
high rates in Malta and Sweden but also in Luxembourg, Cyprus, Austria, and Belgium. At the 
other end of the spectrum, rates are very low for the Iberian and Baltic countries.
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Most asylum claims are “spontaneous” applications—they are made by individuals or families 
arriving in the country of asylum or at the border. An unknown but large proportion of these 
seekers arrives illegally. Once an asylum claim is lodged, it enters an adjudication process to 
determine whether the applicant is a genuine refugee. Applicants who gain refugee status 
are allowed to stay and normally to settle permanently in the receiving country. Those whose 
claims are rejected are required to leave, although many disappear from sight and stay on as 
illegal immigrants.
asylum policies and their effects
Asylum policies have changed substantially since the 1990s. A principal motivation behind 
these policy changes has been to tighten the rules in order to control what in some periods has 
seemed like an ever-rising tide of applications. Asylum policy is multi-faceted, but the individual 
measures can be divided into three broad categories. One relates to policies that limit access 
to the receiving country’s asylum procedures, mainly by preventing potential asylum-seekers 
from reaching the country. A second relates to the status determination procedure and the 
rules governing whether an applicant gains refugee status. A third includes policies relating to 
welfare conditions faced by asylum applicants during and immediately after processing.
Several attempts have been made to capture the stance of asylum policies for the main receiving 
countries [2], [3]. The idea is to form an overall index based on changes in a diverse range of 
laws, regulations, and practices relating to asylum. One such index, shown in Figure 2, is an 
unweighted average for 14 European countries, comprising 15 components, each of which 
increases by one unit when policy becomes markedly tougher for asylum-seekers. The index is 
intended to reflect changes in policy that result in major alterations in the conditions facing a 
substantial proportion of asylum-seekers. Such judgments are inevitably subjective, but they 
are based on contemporary reports by country experts rather than on ex-post evaluations 
of the outcomes of policy change. Examples include implementing substantial changes in 
visa policies, fast-tracking the processing of “manifestly unfounded” claims, and providing 
subsistence only at reception centers.
Starting from zero at the beginning of 1997, the index shows a steep rise from 2000 to 2005, 
and then a mild increase in toughness after 2006. The steep rise in the early 2000s represents a 
considerable tightening of policy, which was partially a response to the surge in asylum claims 
Figure 2. Asylum policy index, unweighted 14-country average  
Note: The index consists of 15 components and is intended to show major alterations in policies facing asylum-
seekers. Each one-unit increase indicates a toughening of standards. Countries included are Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
Source: Author's own calculations.
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from 1997 to 2002 (see Figure 1). The more gentle increase after 2006 probably reflects the 
reduced number of applications after 2004, which weakened policy imperatives. But it may 
also reflect the growing involvement of the EU in setting policy, as discussed below.
One widely debated question is whether such policies actually deter asylum applications. The 
evidence suggests that they do [2], [3], [4]. Policies that matter most are those relating to 
border control and the process for determining refugee status. For 19 OECD countries for 
which estimates are available, the effect of the dramatic tightening of access to territory and 
tougher processing policies between 2001 and 2006 was to reduce annual asylum claims by 
108,000 [3]. These effects account for a 19% decline from the 2001 level and for 33% of the 
decline in total applications from 2001 to 2006. Thus, policy has a significant deterrent effect, 
but conditions in source countries matter even more.
The case for cooperation over asylum policies
In democratic societies, immigration policies are often viewed from the perspective of whether 
they serve the interests of host populations, either specific individuals, as in the case of family 
reunification, or the wider economy, as in the case of skill-selective labor migration. But asylum 
is different: refugees are admitted on the grounds of the benefit to themselves rather than to 
others in the host society. This can be seen in the basic criterion for refugee status (from Article 
1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention), which is a “well-founded fear of persecution.”
The benefit to the host society of providing a safe haven for refugees is to satisfy basic 
humanitarian motives. The benefit to one individual does not reduce the value to others, 
and individuals cannot be effectively excluded from benefitting. Thus, because the benefit is 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable, refugees can be viewed as a public good. If one country 
provides sanctuary for those fleeing persecution, then residents of another country benefit 
from the knowledge that these refugees have found safety. But the costs fall only on the 
country providing refuge. If each country sets its asylum policy independently, that policy will 
fail to take account of the benefits flowing to the residents of other countries. In such a case, 
the public good will be under-provided. A benevolent social planner would set policies that 
take the public-good spillover into account.
In a setting where the demand for asylum (the number of applicants for asylum) differs across 
potential receiving countries (Figure 3), policies set non-cooperatively will also differ. Countries 
receiving a disproportionate number of claims will have tougher policies in order to limit the 
number of such refugees to the desired level. If the policies of different countries were to be 
set by a single benevolent social planner, more refugees would be admitted, but policies would 
still differ across countries because they face different levels of demand. If, on the other hand, 
a central authority were to impose the same policy for all countries, then relative to the social 
optimum, some countries would have too many refugees and some would have too few. Thus 
the overall social optimum would not be reached [5].
If a centralized policy seeks to set common standards for the adjudication of asylum claims, 
for border controls, and for the treatment of asylum-seekers, as in the case of the Common 
European Asylum System, then some other mechanism must be found to reach the social 
optimum. One possibility would be to establish a common fund to compensate countries 
hosting a disproportionate number of asylum refugees. Another possibility would be to first 
set the central policy to obtain what would be the optimal number for all countries as a group 
and then to reallocate the cases to obtain the “right” number for each country.
IZA World of Labor | February 2015 | wol.iza.org
5
Tim HaTTon  |  Setting policy on asylum: Has the EU got it right?
  
Development of the Common European asylum System
Cooperation between EU countries over asylum policies dates from the 1990s, largely in 
response to the surge in asylum applications illustrated in Figure 1. The 1990 Dublin Convention 
provided a method for determining which country should deal with an asylum claim, in order 
to prevent “asylum shopping.” Normally this is the country of first entry. Resolutions made 
at a ministerial meeting in London in 1992 included a measure of agreement on designating 
as “safe” certain countries of origin and of transit, with the idea that applicants from such 
countries could be safely rejected. A number of other measures were agreed in the 1990s, on 
issues such as designating some countries as “safe”. But for the most part, asylum policies were 
set by national governments, with very little direct coordination. The concurrent tightening of 
policies by individual countries during the 1990s largely reflected the Europe-wide surge in 
asylum applications [2].
The development of policy at the EU level began with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, which 
passed the initiative for policy formation to the European Commission after 2002. Meanwhile, 
the European Council meeting at Tampere in 1999 laid out plans to develop the Common 
European Asylum System. Based on “full and inclusive” application of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, these plans focused on harmonizing key areas of asylum policy. They included a 
revised version of the Dublin Regulation, now linked to the EURODAC fingerprint database. 
There were also directives covering the criteria for granting asylum (the Qualification Directive) 
as well as the procedures to be used in adjudicating claims (the Asylum Procedures Directive) 
and the rights and conditions afforded to asylum-seekers (the Reception Conditions 
Directive). These directives laid down only minimum standards, and harmonization across the 
full range of procedures was far from complete.
Figure 3. Asylum applications vary greatly by country (applications per 1,000 population),
2009–2013  
Source: Based on data from UN Refugee Agency. Asylum Trends 2013: Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries.
Geneva: UNHCR, 2014; Table 1. Online at: http://www.unhcr.org/5329b15a9.html [1].   
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In the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s, some steps were taken toward sharing 
responsibilities (burden-sharing). The European Refugee Fund, established in 2000, provided a 
common financial pool to support projects for integrating refugees into the host country and 
to provide resources in the event of a mass influx of refugees. Although this was expanded to 
provide for initiatives on reception and return of asylum-seekers, it remained small in relation 
to the total numbers of refugees. Another measure was the Temporary Protection Directive of 
2001, whose purpose was to relocate refugees from countries under exceptional pressure in 
the event of a mass influx. While the Temporary Protection Directive provides some basis for 
burden-sharing, it lacks a formal triggering mechanism or a formula for redistribution. Not 
surprisingly, it has never been invoked.
The next stage in the development of the Common European Asylum System was the 
Hague Programme implemented in 2004–2010, which deepened integration in a number of 
areas. These included the establishment in 2005 of the FRONTEX agency to integrate and 
standardize border control and surveillance. There was also further harmonization of the 
rules and procedures for determining refugee status determination. Programs for integrating 
refugees into the host country were also expanded with enhanced financial support from the 
European Refugee Fund.
In 2010, the European Asylum Support Office was established in Malta with the aim of 
disseminating best-practice methods and supporting states facing exceptional asylum 
pressures. While the office was also expected to assist in the relocation of recognized refugees, 
that is to be done only on an agreed basis between member states and with the consent of the 
individuals concerned. In addition, the Dublin Regulation was further revised to take account 
(at least in principle) of the pressures faced by different countries; the European Refugee Fund 
was augmented and its name changed to the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund; and 
the key directives were further revised and upgraded.
The Common European asylum System and burden-sharing
All these measures represent considerable progress in harmonizing the rules, standards, and 
procedures for granting asylum. Nevertheless, application of the directives and regulations 
remains uneven across the EU. Much less progress has been made in developing effective 
burden-sharing policies. What this means is that if all countries share the same asylum rules, 
demand for asylum will still differ across countries and so will the distribution of recognized 
refugees. Thus, the current arrangements cannot reach the social optimum described above. 
Starting from a position where differences in policy reflected differences in the demand for 
asylum, convergence in policies could potentially lead to even greater divergence in refugee 
burdens, as seems to have happened between 1996–2000 and 2006–2010.
Not surprisingly, there have been ongoing discussions of burden-sharing mechanisms starting 
as far back as the 1990s. Proposed formulas have been based on estimates of countries’ 
capacity to host refugees, usually calibrated on some combination of population, population 
density, and GDP per capita. One study for the European Commission using asylum 
applications in 2008 found that equalizing the burden would require transferring between 
one-third and two-fifths of all applicants [6]. A study for the European Parliament estimated 
the need for more modest transfers of 15–18% of the total inflow in 2007 [7]. It considered the 
possibility of financial compensation to countries receiving excess numbers of asylum-seekers 
but concluded that this would involve too vast an expansion of the European Refugee Fund. 
The study concluded that a policy of redistribution “is the only mechanism that is likely to have 
a real impact on the distribution of asylum costs and responsibilities across member states.”
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Supposing that there was sufficient political will to pursue some element of redistribution of 
asylum applications across EU countries, the question becomes how this could be realized. 
It would require much greater centralization of asylum policy. Essentially, responsibility for 
adjudicating asylum claims and assigning successful applicants to different EU countries would 
pass from member states to the EU. That would require a substantial upgrading of the EU’s 
authority and its capacity to implement policy. But some of the building blocks are already in 
place. One of these is the European Asylum Support Office, a central administration whose 
functions would need to be substantially expanded. At present it has a mandate to support, 
assist, and coordinate but not to direct.
Another is the Temporary Protection Directive, which was issued in the wake of the Kosovo crisis 
to provide protection in the event of a mass influx and to promote a “balance of efforts between 
Member States.” This directive needs to be revived from its moribund state by investing it with 
the power to direct at times of crisis. The lack of a formal triggering mechanism has meant 
that this directive has never been activated. Yet as the pressure of refugee numbers mounted 
in Malta after 2009, a modest reallocation program (600 cases) was initiated. Member states 
participated on a voluntary basis, and the operation was conducted with the involvement of 
the International Organization for Migration and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).
Perhaps most in need of reform is the Dublin Regulation. After two revisions, it still works 
on the principle that an asylum claim should be dealt with by only one state, usually the first 
state of entry. Mechanisms have been developed to determine when a member state should 
“take back” or “take charge” of a particular asylum case. As has long been recognized, this 
means that in some instances asylum cases are referred to countries that are already under 
pressure. A better idea would be to scrap the current regulation and establish a mechanism 
for reallocating asylum claims in a way that improves rather than worsens the distribution.
But, of course, change is not that simple. Critics argue that compulsory reallocation of asylum-
seekers could violate human rights and that separating the processing of applicants and the 
resettlement of refugees between countries would multiply the cost. Yet such systems have long 
operated within countries. In Germany, for example, refugees are allocated between (and then 
within) the country’s 16 states. Nevertheless, it might reduce costs (and improve incentives) to 
reallocate applicants before rather than after processing. Others suggest that the sheer scale 
of transfers makes this infeasible. One solution would be to redirect asylum claims only when 
the number of applications to a particular country exceeded a critical threshold, rather than 
trying to match the numbers exactly to a distribution key. Another would be to introduce a 
more market-based mechanism such as tradable admissions quotas and combine it with a 
mechanism to match transferees to the preferences of host countries [8].
Political feasibility
A major stumbling block in developing the Common European Asylum System is the perception 
that national electorates are, to various degrees, opposed to liberalizing asylum rules and 
unambiguously prefer tougher rules and fewer refugees. One reason is that politicians and the 
media have managed to conflate the term “asylum-seeker” with terms like “illegal immigrant” 
and “welfare scrounger.” In 2002 (and not subsequently), the European Social Survey asked 
respondents whether they agreed with the statement: “The [national] government should 
be generous in judging applications for refugee status.” On average across 19 EU countries, 
one-third of respondents agreed with the statement, while two-fifths disagreed. So despite 
that being a time of very high asylum claims (see Figure 1), the balance of opinion was not 
IZA World of Labor | February 2015 | wol.iza.org
8
Tim HaTTon  |  Setting policy on asylum: Has the EU got it right?
  
overwhelmingly negative. Not surprisingly, opinion was more negative the higher the number 
of applications per capita [9].
The European Social Survey also asked respondents (in 2002 only) at which political level 
decision-making on immigration and refugee policy should occur: international, European, 
national, or regional/local. On average across the 19 countries, 58% selected the international 
or European level [9]. This finding, echoed in surveys such as the World Values Survey and 
Transatlantic Trends, suggests that there is far more support for supranational policy making 
than is often believed.
Nevertheless, there are concerns about whether EU member governments would see it as 
in their interest to participate in such a scheme, which could leave some countries worse 
off than in the absence of cooperation [10]. Another concern is that the welfare benefits of 
cooperation might be undermined by countries strategically choosing an unduly negative 
bargaining stance [11]. However, these analyses focus on situations in which representatives of 
national governments negotiate over policy settings that would (and should) differ by country. 
This contrasts with the situation where policy-setting is ceded to a supranational body over 
which individual governments have little direct control.
That leaves the question of whether EU institutions would craft an asylum policy that comes 
closer to the social optimum than the current situation. There are some reasons to think that 
they would. The EU has successfully established a bulwark against restrictive policy moves 
in some countries [12]. A strong pro-refugee tendency is reflected in recent decisions of the 
European Court of Justice and in the inauguration in 2007 of the Fundamental Rights Agency. 
Yet there are serious threats to building a more integrated and enlightened asylum system. One 
is that recent trends in European Parliament elections do not seem favorable to constructive 
reforms in asylum policy, notwithstanding the increased accountability introduced by the 
inception of co-decision-making between the European Council and the European Parliament.
LimiTaTionS anD GaPS
There has been considerable progress on cooperation over asylum policies within the EU. 
But the underlying basis for cooperation remains unclear. Viewing refugees as a public good 
provides a clear rationale for cooperation and suggests that refugee places will be under-
provided in the absence of jointly determined policy. But the value of public goods is hard 
to establish, and all the more so in the case of refugees, an issue over which opinions differ 
widely. An unresolved question is exactly how much value the citizens of one country place on 
refugees that are given a safe haven in another country.
For reasons outlined above, the distribution across countries of asylum applicants and refugees 
is important. When that distribution is severely imbalanced, the total number of refugees that 
are given protection is likely to be sub-optimal. The harmonization of asylum policies and the 
Dublin Regulation have exacerbated these imbalances. Although national governments have 
adopted internal distribution mechanisms, it would require a step-change to implement such 
a mechanism across EU countries. This would require a further transfer of power to the EU, 
something likely to be seen as yet another threat to national sovereignty.
Although the arguments presented here do not apply exclusively to the EU, the scope for wider 
application is limited. Incorporating countries like Norway and Switzerland, and perhaps a 
few others, into the Common European Asylum System is one possibility. There has been 
some cooperation in response to crises between Canada and the US and between Australia 
and New Zealand. But these countries already have large resettlement programs. The scope 
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for wider cooperation within these regions is limited because of big gaps in development and 
the lack of EU-style regional frameworks. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, many of 
their nearest neighbors are not even signatories to the Refugee Convention.
The UNHCR estimates that 80% of the 12 million refugees in the world are in low- and middle-
income countries. They are often stranded in dire conditions, sometimes for protracted 
periods, in makeshift camps across the border from their country of origin. Resettlement and 
independent asylum-seeking to rich countries make very small inroads on the numbers in these 
seemingly intractable situations. Deeper cooperation on asylum between rich countries would 
help, but it would not solve the larger refugee problem.
For more than a decade, the UNHCR has been urging greater cooperation between rich and 
poor countries, but it has been unable to broker any firm agreement on burden-sharing [13]. 
There is simply too little alignment of interests to support any sort of grand bargain. Direct aid 
and assistance seem more realistic goals, especially to countries like Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Pakistan, and South Sudan, where the numbers of refugees far exceed local capacity. A shift in 
focus toward the regional level for facilitating refugee integration, resettlement, and return is 
more realistic but remains grossly underfunded.
SUmmaRY anD PoLiCY aDViCE
The Common European Asylum Policy has come a long way and has achieved some successes. 
The focus has been on the harmonization of border controls, the process of determining 
refugee status, and the conditions faced by asylum-seekers. More attention needs to be 
given to creating a more even distribution of asylum claims across countries in order to 
reach the socially optimum number. One possibility would be to beef up the existing Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund to provide greater compensation to countries that receive 
a disproportionate number of asylum-seekers. A much more realistic option would be to 
reallocate some proportion of asylum claims across countries. This would involve abolishing 
the existing Dublin Regulation and substituting an alternative system that improves the 
distribution. In order to limit the scale of transfers, claims could be redirected only when the 
applications to a country exceed a critical threshold rather than aiming for exact equalization. 
An alternative would be to introduce tradable admissions quotas and combine this with a 
mechanism to match transferees to receiving countries. Some of the building blocks for a 
redistribution system are in place, but further centralization of policy is required. While there 
may be political impediments, public opinion is more supportive than is sometimes believed.
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